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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Craig Robert Falk appeals from his convictions for aggravated battery, enhanced by use
of a deadly weapon, and burglary.

He argues on appeal that the district court abused its

sentencing discretion by executing an aggregate, unified sentence of twenty years with eleven
years fixed.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Karen Quinn was involved in a contentious divorce with her now ex-husband, Roger
Falk, during which Roger repeatedly “threatened her life” and stated that he would “do whatever
daughter. 1 (PSI, pp. 1-2; Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, L. 21

it took” to maintain custody of his e

– p. 25, L. 7; Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 22 – p. 90, L. 9. 2) As part of that effort, he made insistent but
entirely unsubstantiated allegations that Ms. Quinn had abused their daughter when, in fact, he
was judged to have an inappropriate and “toxic” relationship with his daughter that Department
of Health and Welfare personnel were concerned involved grooming. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 37, L. 5 – p.
40, L. 23; p. 113, L. 18 – p. 114, L. 9.) In a “last push” to maintain custody of his daughter,
Roger began “contacting people he has not spoken to in years to see what he could come up
with.” (PSI, pp. 1, 142.)

1

To avoid confusion between the defendant, Craig Falk, and his brother, Roger Falk, the state
will refer to the defendant as “Falk” and his brother as “Roger.”
2
The pdf file of transcripts contains two separately paginated volumes. The first, containing the
transcript of the preliminary hearing, extends from pages 1-14 of the file. The second, containing
the transcript of the change of plea hearing and the transcript of the sentencing hearing, extends
from pages 15-54 of the file. The state will refer to the former as “Tr. Vol. I” and the latter as
“Tr. Vol. II.”
1

One of those people was his brother, the defendant, Falk, who was living in Georgia.
(PSI, pp. 1-2.) On November 29, 2019, Falk―whom Ms. Quinn had never met―appeared
outside Ms. Quinn’s home as she returned from shopping with her daughter, followed her into
her garage, and severely beat her with a metal bar while her daughter looked on. (Tr. Vol. I, p.
13, L. 1 – p. 20, L. 2; p. 22, L. 19 – p. 23, L. 3.) Ms. Quinn suffered serious injuries to her head
and arms, and spent four days in the intensive care unit. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 17, L. 13 – p. 18, L. 8; p.
21, L. 5 – p. 22, L. 12; PSI, pp. 207-10 (partial medical records).)
Later the same day, an officer observed Falk, who met the description of the person who
assaulted Ms. Quinn, walking and carrying a black bag. (PSI, p. 138.) When the officer called
out to him, Falk acknowledged the officer but then tried to hide the bag, which was later
recovered and found to contain the metal bar―a barbell― with which he had beaten Ms. Quinn.
(PSI, pp. 138-39.) Falk’s rental car was found near Ms. Quinn’s home and a search of the car
recovered notes, including “get phone in Utah charge”; “call Roger, take out battery, and get
envelope”; two addresses in Boise, one of which was the location where Ms. Quinn routinely
dropped her daughter off for visitation with Roger; “Gloves, hat coat, Barbell knife,
pick/Philips”; “big bags, change of clothes”; Ms. Quinn’s name and address; a map with
directions to Ms. Quinn’s home; and the name of Ms. Quinn’s then-boyfriend, his phone number,
along with the nickname (“Lemon Head”) that Roger used to refer to him. (PSI, pp. 136-37, 14748; Tr. Vol. II, p. 108, L. 1 – p. 111, L. 5.) While Falk initially denied any involvement in the
attack on Ms. Quinn, claiming that he had been “setup” by someone (PSI, pp. 132-33), he later
claimed that he was only trying to “scare” her to help his brother, but Ms. Quinn said something
that he could not remember, he “just started swinging,” and “blacked out” (PSI, pp. 101, 151-53).

2

The state charged Falk with aggravated battery, enhanced by use of a deadly weapon, and
burglary. (R., pp. 42-43.) Falk agreed to enter Alford 3 pleas to all charges. (R., pp. 60-67; Tr.
Vol. II, p. 8, L. 8 – p. 12, L. 8.) He claimed that he was entering Alford pleas because, while he
remembered entering the garage to “scare” Ms. Quinn, and he remembered swinging the metal
bar at her, he could not remember anything else until he saw her sitting on the ground and heard
his niece “shrieking.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 12, Ls. 16-21; p. 14, Ls. 2-9; p. 19, Ls. 10-21.) The court
accepted the pleas. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 20, L. 22 – p. 21, L. 3.)
At sentencing, the state recommended an aggregate, unified sentence of thirty years with
fifteen years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 94, Ls. 19-25.) Defense counsel recommended retained
jurisdiction without specifying an underlying sentence. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 137, Ls. 14-21.) The
district court imposed and executed an aggregate, unified sentence of twenty years with eleven
years fixed. 4 (Tr. Vol. II, p. 154, Ls. 5-11; R., pp. 85-87.) Falk timely appealed. (R., pp. 89-91.)

3

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
On appeal, Falk mistakenly identifies the sentence as an aggregate, unified sentence of twenty
years with ten years fixed. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-3.)
4

3

ISSUE
Falk states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Falk, a
Georgia resident with no criminal history, to a unified term of twenty
years, with nine years fixed, for aggravated battery, and ten years fixed for
burglary.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Falk failed to show that the district court clearly abused its sentencing discretion by
imposing and executing an aggregate, unified sentence of twenty years with eleven years fixed
for aggravated battery, enhanced by use of a deadly weapon, and burglary?

4

ARGUMENT
Falk Has Not Shown That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Falk argues only that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

Without so much as citing the district court’s sentencing discussion, he argues that there is no
reasonable view of the facts under which the sentence was appropriate and the court should have
suspended his sentence or retained jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.) Falk has not shown
that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, as is the

decision not to retain jurisdiction. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391
(2007); State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001). In evaluating whether a
lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks
“whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
C.

Falk Has Not Shown That His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any Reasonable View Of
The Facts
“Refusal to retain jurisdiction will not be deemed a clear abuse of discretion if the trial

court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.” Statton, 136 Idaho at 137, 30 P.3d at 292 (quotation marks

5

and brackets omitted). An appellant arguing that a sentence is excessive must establish that it
was excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170
P.3d 397, 401 (2007); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 660, 978 P.2d 214, 220 (1999). In
determining whether the appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but,
because the decision to release the defendant on parole is exclusively the province of the
executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual
incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver,
144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant
must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2015). “A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be sufficient.” State
v. Struhs, 158 Idaho 262, 268, 346 P.3d 279, 285 (2015). “In deference to the trial judge, [the
appellate court] will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds
might differ.”

McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quotation marks omitted).

“Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be
considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.’” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,
90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
Falk acknowledges that his sentence is well within statutory limits. (Appellant’s brief, p.
5.) Setting aside the burglary conviction, he was subject to up to thirty years in prison on his
conviction for aggravated battery enhanced by use of a deadly weapon alone. See I.C. §§ 18-908,

6

19-2520. Nevertheless, and without discussing the district court’s stated reasons for imposing
and executing the sentence it did, he argues that the district court abused its discretion because
there is no reasonable view of the facts under which the district court’s sentence was necessary to
serve any of the goals of sentencing. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)
The district court determined that, in light of “the nature of the crime and the severity of
the beating and its substantial and predictable emotional effects on the victim,” probation was
not appropriate and a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 146, Ls. 4-7.) “It is very difficult to look at a man’s uninvited invasion into a woman’s garage,
carrying a weapon and ultimately beating her severely with that weapon, as something that can
merit less than an imposed sentence whatever the motivation for entering the garage and doing
that.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 145, Ls. 14-19.)
The court was also deeply skeptical about Falk’s account of the events. Below, as on
appeal, Falk’s central argument was that he was manipulated by his brother into believing that
Ms. Quinn was abusing his niece and driving his brother to near suicide; he travelled from
Georgia to Boise only to be supportive of and to visit his brother; while in Boise he concocted
the plan to help his brother by scaring Ms. Quinn, which plan he developed and executed on his
own initiative, without planning or coordination with his brother, while significantly sleep
deprived and “running out of time” to help; and he never had any intent to harm Ms. Quinn in
any way, but blacked out while trying to scare her. (PSI, pp. 18-28; Tr. Vol. II, p. 129, L. 14 – p.
133, L. 5; p. 142, L. 2 – p. 143, L. 2.) Likewise, on appeal, he suggests that, “in some ways,” he
was a victim in this case because he was allegedly manipulated to be sympathetic to his brother
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7), but that the attack “was never planned” or “intended at any point”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5).

7

For very good reason, the district court did not find this at all credible. (Tr. Vol. II, p.
146, L. 8 – p. 151, L. 24.) Instead, the court judged that “the version of events in which the
defendant’s brother and the defendant planned some sort of attack on Ms. Quinn has much better
support in the evidence.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148, Ls. 4-7.)
Falk was living on very little income and claimed that he funded his trip to Idaho by
borrowing money from his son. (PSI, p. 22.) When interviewed by police, though, his son
denied loaning Falk any money. (PSI, p. 157.) Instead, as the district court recognized, “it seems
likely that the defendant’s brother may have had a role” in funding the trip. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 149,
Ls. 9-19.)
Falk then flew into Salt Lake City, rented a hotel for four days, rented a car, and drove
back and forth between Salt Lake City and Boise each day, all allegedly to save money and
because he did not realize the distance between Salt lake City and Boise. (PSI, pp. 22-24; Tr.
Vol. II, p. 66, L. 18 – p. 70, L. 6; Exs. 5-6 (cell phone tracking data showing that Falk’s phone
travelled back and forth between Salt Lake City and Boise repeatedly between November 2729).) A search of Falk’s computer showed that he researched the distance from Salt Lake City to
Boise prior to his trip. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 57, Ls. 19-25.) Rather than an attempt to save money and
an inadvertent error regarding the distance to Boise, his bizarre travel arrangements suggest an
attempt to minimize “clear items of evidence that he was in Boise, which tends to support the
idea that something more than putting a scare into Ms. Quinn was part of the plan.” (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 150, Ls. 5-15.)
Next, Falk purchased a new cell phone when he arrived in Salt Lake City that he used
during his trip, which he claimed that he did because he forgot his cell phone. (PSI, p. 24.) But
he provided no explanation why he also suddenly started calling Roger on a different number,
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found written on a note in his rental car, that turned out to be for a separate “burner” cell phone
associated with Roger. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 56, L. 11 – p. 57, L. 7; p. 62, Ls. 4-20.) As the district
court noted, “they are both using means of communication that seemingly they’re hoping will be
difficult to trace back to them.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148, Ls. 9-19.) In addition, cell phone data
showed that they were communicating regularly right up until the attack on Ms. Quinn and were
frequently at or near the same location. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 66, L. 18 – p. 77, L. 16.)
As the district court also recognized (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148, L. 20 – p. 149, L. 8), the notes
found in Falk’s rental car―directions to Ms. Quinn’s home, a description of her car, her license
plate number, the nickname used by Roger for her boyfriend and his cell phone number, the
address where Roger would meet Ms. Quinn for visitation with his daughter, etc.―was
information that he would likely have received from Roger and for the purpose of locating and
tracking her (Tr. Vol. II, p. 108, L. 1 – p. 111, L. 5; PSI, pp. 136-37, 147-48). Other notes―
“Gloves, hat coat, Barbell knife, pick/Philips”; “big bags, change of clothes”; “get phone in Utah
charge”; “call Roger, take out battery, and get envelope”―clearly suggest a plan to disguise
himself, attack Ms. Quinn with the barbell, and cover-up the attack, all in coordination with
Roger. (Id.)
Finally, the court noted that Falk stated that he “taped up the end” of the metal bar so as
to have a better grip, which certainly suggests that he intended to swing it, and that there was no
plausible explanation why he would suddenly start swinging the bar at Ms. Quinn if he had no
intent to attack her. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 150, L. 16 – p. 151, L. 11; PSI, p. 101.)
In short, the district court had very good reason to doubt Falk’s credibility and whether he
had been candid regarding the purpose of his trip, the involvement of his brother, and the extent
to which he had planned the attack on Ms. Quinn. The court found that it was “highly likely,
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based on all the information that has been accumulated, that the defendant intended to physically
harm Ms. Quinn” and that he did so “in coordinated fashion” with his brother. (Tr. Vol. II, p.
151, Ls. 12-24.) On appeal, though he cites to his own account, he has not challenged (or even
acknowledged) the district court’s credibility determinations or its findings. State v. Detweiler,
115 Idaho 443, 447, 767 P.2d 286, 290 (Ct. App. 1989) (“It is the trial judge’s task to weigh
disputed evidence and, where applicable, to make credibility determinations.”); State v. Kinser,
141 Idaho 557, 560, 112 P.3d 845, 848 (Ct. App. 2005) (“The appellant has the burden of
establishing that the trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.”). Having determined
that Falk was not being candid with the court and had not taken full responsibility for his
conduct, including by entering Alford pleas, the court determined that it was not appropriate to
impose a lesser sentence than would otherwise be warranted by the nature and severity of the
crime. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 151, L. 25 – p. 152, L. 25.) See State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735, 740, 932
P.2d 363, 368 (Ct. App. 1997) (in rejecting excessive sentence claim, noting that district court
concluded that defendant’s account of events and expression of remorse were not credible); State
v. Leon, 142 Idaho 705, 711, 132 P.3d 462, 468 (Ct. App. 2006) (in rejecting excessive sentence
claim, noting that appellant entered an Alford plea and had not taken full responsibility).
Even if it had credited Falk’s account of events, the district court stated that it would still
have believed it was appropriate impose and execute a sentence of significant time in prison.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 147, Ls. 10-25.) The district court made that determination while explicitly
considering the mitigating factors to which Falk now points on appeal―his age, his health, his
lack of criminal history, and the fact that evaluators judged him to be a low risk to reoffend. (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 153, Ls. 1-22.) As the court concluded, even if this offense was “one-off,” it was “an
extremely serious” one-off that warranted a serious sentence. (Id.)

10

While acknowledging that his crimes “were horrific” and have permanently scarred both
Ms. Quinn and her daughter, who watched Falk attack her mother with a pipe (see Tr. Vol. II, p.
79, L. 15 – p. 93, L. 17 (Ms. Quinn’s testimony describing the lasting effects of Falk’s attack on
her and her daughter)), Falk argues there is no reasonable view of the facts under which the
sentence in this case was necessary for any of the goals of sentencing (Appellant’s brief, pp. 58).
He claims that, due to his age, the sentence cannot be reasonably viewed as necessary to
serve the goal of retribution. (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) But a defendant’s advanced age in no way
diminishes the state’s interest in retribution and in ensuring that “horrific” criminal conduct is
met with commensurate punishment. See State v. Anderson, 119 Idaho 204, 206, 804 P.2d 933,
935 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming sentence of fifteen years fixed after

with health

problems was convicted of sexual abuse of a child, and stating that “even a fixed life sentence
may be deemed reasonable if the offense is so egregious that it demands an exceptionally severe
measure of retribution and deterrence”); State v. Roseman, 122 Idaho 934, 935, 841 P.2d 1085,
1086 (Ct. App. 1992) (affirming sentence of two years fixed for

with

health problems). “[T]he nature and gravity of the underlying offense may, standing alone,”
justify an extended sentence, and “considerations of societal retribution and general deterrence
are not decided on the basis of the unique characteristics of the offender; rather these
considerations are decided upon the characteristics of the offense.” State v. Windom, 150 Idaho
873, 880, 253 P.3d 310, 317 (2011).
He claims that the sentence cannot be justified by deterrence because he “was adamant
that he never intended to harm [Ms. Quinn] and could not recall exactly what occurred.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) But of course that is precisely the narrative that the district court
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rejected below. In addition, notwithstanding his Alford pleas and his claim that he did not intend
to harm Ms. Quinn, Falk was properly sentenced for convictions that necessarily involved such
intent. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 17, L. 18 – p. 19, L. 3 (district court clarifying during plea colloquy that
the crimes for which he was entering Alford pleas would require the state to show that he
intended to batter Ms. Quinn when he entered her garage and that he willfully caused her great
bodily injury).) See State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 96, 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. App. 1995)
(“[O]nce the Alford plea is entered, the court may treat the defendant, for purpose of sentencing,
as if he or she were guilty.”). In addition, though, he simply ignores the distinction between
individual or specific deterrence, on the one hand, and general deterrence, on the other. Whether
or not it would have deterred Falk, a sentence may be imposed “in order to deter others from
committing similar offenses. General deterrence is one of the several objectives of criminal
punishment and has been held to be a sufficient reason for imposing a prison sentence.” State v.
Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 76, 577 P.2d 1123, 1124 (1978). See
also State
- --- - -v.
- -Carper,
- - - - 116 Idaho 77,
80, 773 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Ct. App. 1989) (“When we speak of deterrence under Toohill, we mean
general deterrence—that is, deterrence of the public generally”).
The district court here was expressly concerned with the severity and violence of this
attack, and the harm caused to its victims, and determined that the sentence was necessary for
retribution and punishment, so as not to diminish the severity of the crime, and for purposes of
deterrence. See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003) (where crime
was “egregious” and sentence was based on the goals of punishment and deterrence, affirming
term of twenty years fixed); State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App.
1989) (“To the extent that a minimum period of confinement represents the judicially determined

12

‘price’ of a crime, the criteria of retribution and deterrence are particularly important.”). Falk has
not shown that the district court abused its discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Falk’s sentence.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Andrew V. Wake
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